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Abstract 
Continuous growth in modern avionics systems complexity allows the extension of the functionality of flight control and navigation systems 
and leads to an increase in operating expenses. Currently, avionics maintenance costs approximately 30% of the total aircraft maintenance 
costs. Great impact on the avionics maintenance cost has high rate of intermittent failures, which has been estimated as approximately 50% in 
military avionics. Here, a mathematical reliability model of continuously tested LRU subject to permanent and intermittent failures is 
developed. Mathematical expressions for availability of redundant systems are derived considering the spare part system sufficiency. A 
detailed analysis of the three different variants of the breakdown maintenance strategy (BMS) of modern avionics systems is presented. A 
criterion of optimizing the number of spare parts is proposed. Some considerations for choosing the optimum variant of the BMS are outlined. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
At present, aircrafts such as B757, B767, B777, B787, 
A340, and A380 use digital avionics. Modern avionics 
comprise a set of redundant and easily removable LRUs. Each 
LRU includes several SRUs and has its own BITE. Modular 
design offers easy access to circuits and components for 
inspection or servicing. The LRUs operate up to the safe 
failures (permanent and intermittent), which are registered 
during flights or after landing. This type of maintenance 
strategy is called BMS. Dismantled LRUs can be retested and 
repaired either at the manufacturer or at the base airport 
facilities. In the last case, it is necessary to have ATE for 
retesting each dismantled LRU and detecting a failed SRU. 
Thus, the flight safety of modern aircraft is provided using 
redundant avionics systems, while the flight regularity is 
provided using a sufficient number of spare LRUs. However, 
the described maintenance strategy is ineffective in the case of 
high rate of NFF events because ATE does not confirm the 
fact of intermittent failures and the same intermittent failures 
may re-occur in the next flights. Aviation data suggest that 
there are more than 400,000 NFF cases per year, where a false 
alarm is given and no fault is detected after investigation [1]. 
As shown in [2, 3], the estimated NFF rates for avionics 
systems is between 20% and 50%. Theoretical calculations 
given in [4] show that the fleet, flying 30,000 hours per year, 
may have losses due to the NFF phenomena up to ₤500,000 
annually. The impact of NFF on airlines includes an increase 
in service time, reduction of the regularity, and availability, as 
well as an increase in the spare LRUs, which ultimately leads 
to an increase in the lifecycle costs of avionics. Thus, when 
choosing the optimal variant of the BMS it is necessary to 
consider the effect of intermittent failures on the lifecycle 
costs of avionics. 
The following references do not relate to avionics lifecycle 
costs, which is the subject of this study. However, these 
references are important for understanding the proposed 
reliability model of avionics LRUs. 
Nakagava [5] analyzed inspection policy to intermittent 
faults where the test is planned at regular intervals to detect 
the faults. Exponential distribution of time to a permanent and 
intermittent failure is assumed. In [6], a communication 
system subject to intermittent faults is considered. Faults have 
an exponential distribution and are hidden. Faults become 
permanent failures when the duration in hidden state exceeds 
an upper limit time. In [7], a three state Markov model is 
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considered for fault-tolerant systems by taking the effects of 
permanent and intermittent faults into consideration. The 
reliability of standby and duplex systems are analyzed. In [8], 
a reliability analysis is conducted for optimal periodic testing 
of intermittent faults that minimizes the test cost. A Markov 
model is used for the probabilistic modelling of intermittent 
faults. In [9], a model for studying the reliability of digital 
systems subject to both permanent and intermittent faults is 
considered. The model is based on a Markov model 
containing three states. 
In this study, we consider an LRU subject to permanent 
and intermittent failures with an arbitrary law of failure time 
distribution. We assume that LRU is continuously tested and 
both types of failures are automatically detected by the BITE. 
When the LRU is rejected, a replacement (or as-good-as-new 
repair) is conducted. Dismantled LRUs are directed to repair 
facilities for retesting, and if necessary, repairing. 
 
Nomenclature 
LRU            line replaceable unit 
SRU            shop replaceable unit 
BITE           built-in test equipment 
BMS            breakdown maintenance strategy 
ATE            automatic test equipment 
NFF            no fault found 
MTBF         mean time between failures 
MTBUR      mean time between unscheduled removals 
TLEC          total lifecycle expected costs 
PDF            probability density function 
IF                intermittent failure 
PF               permanent failure 
IFD             intermittent fault detector 
WSPMS     warehouse spare parts management system 
DME          distance measuring equipment 
2. Mathematical model of LRU maintenance 
2.1. Space of LRU states 
When developing a mathematical model of the LRU 
maintenance, we assume that the interval of interest for LRU 
maintenance is infinite. In fact, this is true, because the 
MTBUR of an LRU is usually much less than the aircraft life 
expectancy. The state of the LRU is continuously tested by 
the BITE during time τ, where τ is the mean time between 
aircraft landings in the base airport. The behavior of the LRU 
in the time interval (0, ∞) is described by the stochastic 
process L(t) with finite number of states. The process L(t) 
varies jump-wise. Each jump of L(t) is caused by the 
transition of the LRU to one of the possible states. It is 
assumed that L(t) is a regenerative stochastic process. Let L(t) 
be defined as follows. Assume that the LRU permanent 
failure occurs at time ξ, where kτ < ξ ≤ (k+1)τ. Then, in an 
arbitrary time t the LRU can be in one of the following states: 
S1, if at time t the LRU is in operable state; S2, if at time t the 
LRU is not used and dismantled or mounted on the board of 
an aircraft; S3, if at time t the LRU is not used waiting on the 
aircraft board for replacement by a spare LRU from a 
warehouse; S4, if at time t the LRU with intermittent failure is 
repaired; S5, if at time t the LRU with permanent failure is 
repaired. 
The LRU, which was rejected by the BITE, would have to 
be replaced by an operable LRU from the warehouse. The 
LRU replacement time should be short enough so as not to 
violate aircraft flight regularity. Any delayed departure of the 
aircraft will be bound with economical losses. Therefore, the 
warehouse must have a sufficient number of spare LRUs. On 
the other hand, an excess of spare LRUs in the warehouse will 
also be bound with economical losses, since the cost of 
avionics is extremely high. Thus, there is a real problem of 
choosing the variant of BMS that minimizes the TLEC. 
Let Ti be the time of staying of the LRU in the state Si (i = 
1, 2, …, 5). Obviously, Ti is a random variable with expected 
mean time E[Ti]. Let Ξ be the time to permanent failure. The 
uncertainty in the values that Ξ can take is described through 
the PDF ω(ξ). Analogically, we define the random variable Θ 
as the time to intermittent failure with PDF f(θ). The average 
duration of LRU regeneration cycle is determined by the 
following formula: 
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 ¦                                                                (1) 
2.2. Probabilities of intermittent failures 
To determine the maintenance efficiency indicators, we use 
the joint PDF of random variables Ξ, Θ1, …, Θk, which we 
denote as ω0(ξ, θ1, …, θk), where Θi = Θ – (i – 1)τ is the 
remainder of the operating time to intermittent failure after i – 
1 flights (i = 1, …, k). Using the multiplication theorem of the 
PDFs, we can write 
     0 1 1ω ξ,θ ,...θ ω ξ θ ,...,θ ξk kf ,                         (2) 
where f(θ1, …, θk|ξ) is the conditional PDF of random 
variables Θ1, …, Θk under condition that Ξ = ξ. 
To determine the expected mean times E(Ti), i = 1, …, 5, 
we introduce some conditional probabilities related to 
intermittent failures. The conditional probability of appearing 
the intermittent failure during ν-th (ν = 1, …, k) flight is 
formulated as follows: 
  ^ `ν 1 ν
1





  4 ! 4         (3) 
The conditional probability of not having the occurrence of 
the intermittent failure during k-th flight is formulated as 
follows: 
  ^ `
1
τ,( 1)τ; τ ξ τ ξk iIF O
i
P k k P
 
  4 !                        (4) 
The probabilities (3) and (4) are determined by integrating 
PDF f(θ1, …, θk|ξ) over the corresponding limits. 
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Thus, we have 
   τ. .(ν 1) 1 1
τ τ 0
τ,(ν 1)τ;ντ ξ ,..., | ξ ...IF OP f u u du duQ Q
f f
  ³ ³ ³    (5) 
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τ τ
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f f  ³ ³    (6) 
2.3. Expected mean operation and maintenance times 
The conditional expectation of the time spent by the LRU 
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To determine the expected mean time of staying of the 
LRU in the operable state, we apply to (7) the theorem of total 
expectation for continuous random variable Ξ 
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The expected mean time spent by the LRU in the state S2 is 
> @2 M DE T t t  ,                                                                (9) 
where tM and tD are the mean time of mounting and 
dismantling the LRU on the aircraft board, respectively. 
The expected mean time spent by the LRU in the state S3 is 
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where ΔtSP is the mean waiting time of a spare LRU from the 
warehouse at the base airport and tS is the planned time to stop 
the aircraft at the base airport. 
The conditional expectation of the time spent by the LRU 
in the state S4, under condition that Ξ = ξ is 
 4 ν 1
if
ξ τ,(ν 1)τ;ντ ξ ,
τ ξ ( 1)τ ,
k
IF IF OE T t P
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                    (11) 
where tIF is the mean time of repairing the LRU with an IF. 
The expected time of staying of the LRU in the state S4 
during one regeneration cycle is determined analogically to 
(8) 
> @    ( 1)τ4
0 ν 1τ




E T t P d- -f
  
ª º ¦ ¦³ « »¬ ¼   (12) 
The conditional expectation of the time spent by the LRU 
in the state S5, under condition that Ξ = ξ is 
 5 ξ τ, ( 1)τ; τ ξ , if τ ξ ( 1)τPF IF OE T t P k k k kª º    d ¬ ¼ , (13) 
where tPF is the mean time of repairing the LRU with a PF. 
The expected time of staying of the LRU in the state S5 is 
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As is well known [10], the exponential distribution is the 
appropriate failure distribution for complex systems. Avionics 
LRUs have complex structures. The number of components in 
such systems is huge. For these components, extrinsic and 
intrinsic failure mechanisms can cause the components to fail. 
These failure mechanisms combine together forming a 
constant failure rate, which is only possible with the 
exponential distribution of time to failure [11]. Hence, the 
exponential distribution 
λω( ) λ tt e                                                                       (15) 
is appropriate for most of the modern avionics LRUs, where λ 
is the permanent failure rate. 
Let us consider the case when intermittent failures are also 
subject to the exponential law with the PDF 
θ( ) θ tIFf t e ,                                                                  (16) 
where θ is the intermittent failure rate. 
Because of the memoryless property of the exponential 
distribution law, the probabilities (5) and (6) are converted to 
   (ν 1)θτ θττ,(ν 1)τ;ντ ξ 1IF OP e e                       (17) 
  θττ,( 1)τ; τ ξ kIF OP k k e                                          (18) 
Substituting (15), (17) and (18) into (8), (12), and (14) we 
obtain 
     λτ (λ θ)τ1 1 λ 1E T e e  ª º  ¬ ¼                            (19) 
   θτ λτ (λ θ)τ4 1 1IFE T t e e e   ª º  ¬ ¼                      (20) 
   λτ (λ θ)τ5 1 1PFE T t e e  ª º  ¬ ¼                             (21) 
The expressions for the mean times E[T1], …, E[T5] can be 
used to determine the reliability indicators. 
For example, the LRU average availability is given by 
> @ > @1 0A E T E T                                                            (22) 
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2.4. Mean time between unscheduled removals 
One of the most important indicators of avionics 
operational reliability is MTBUR. High rate of intermittent 
failures significantly reduces MTBUR. As stated in [12], for 
many avionics systems MTBUR is approximately 50% of 
MTBF, which results in 40%–50% increase in direct 
operating costs [13]. For maintenance model considered, 
MTBUR is determined as follows: 
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In particular, assume that the failure time is exponential. 







                                                      (24) 
3. Maintenance model of redundant avionics systems 
3.1. Average availability 
Most avionics systems comprise several identical LRUs 
and the reliability of the system is a function of the individual 
LRU reliabilities. Furthermore, it is assumed that the LRU 
failures are statistically independent. We consider the case of 
active redundancy when all m identical LRUs are in 
operational state from the time the system is put to use. 
Avionics systems are used in an interrupted mode of operation 
caused by the interchanged intervals of flights and stops in 
airports. Such maintenance operations with LRU as 
dismantling, mounting, and testing can be conducted during 
the stop intervals in airports. Hence, LRU states such as S2, S4, 
and S5 are associated with only cost losses and do not affect 
the probability indicators of redundant avionics systems. 
Therefore, we introduce a new time axis which is associated 
with only LRU states S1 and S3 where the LRU is planned to 
be used. 
For parallel structure of avionics system, the average 
availability is given by 
     ^ `1 1 31 1 mA E T E T E T   ª º¬ ¼                      (25) 
For “h-out of-m” structure the average availability is 
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3.2. Total lifecycle expected costs 
Let us focus on the lifecycle cost analysis of a redundant 
avionics system, which comprises m LRUs. The lifetime of 
avionics LRU is defined as the period from the beginning of 
LRU operation to its passage into a state of obsolescence. 
Three possible variants of the BMS are considered below. The 
first variant is easy for the aircraft owner, but it can be very 
expensive. LRUs, rejected by the BITEs, are directed to the 
manufacturer for repair. The owner of the aircraft has no 
ATE, but he should have a relatively large number of spare 
LRUs to ensure the flight regularity. In this variant, the LRUs 
delivered to the manufacturer would include not only the units 
with permanent failures but also the units with intermittent 
failures. The aircraft owner should pay for repairing both 
categories of LRUs. Since the warranty period was over, the 
aircraft owner had to pay the cost of LRU repair, the labor 
cost, and the cost of spare parts throughout the LRU lifetime. 
Therefore, the relevant cost to the owner is TLEC, which is 
the total cost incurred by the owner during the lifetime of 
avionics system. Thus, TLEC1 can be written in the following 
form: 
TLEC1 = Cost of breakdown maintenance + Cost of 
transportation of dismantled LRUS + Cost of repairing LRUS 
at the manufacturer + Cost of spare LRUS per aircraft 
Obviously, the aircraft owner will wish to minimize 
TLEC1. It should be pointed out that TLEC1 does not include 
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  (27) 
where CL is the replacement labour cost per hour; CTR is the 
average transportation cost per repair; CIF is the mean cost of 
repairing the LRU with an IF; CPF is the mean cost of 
repairing the LRU with a PF; PIF is the posteriori probability 
that dismantled the LRU has an IF; PPF is the posteriori 
probability that dismantled the LRU has a PF; T is the LRU 
lifetime excluding its warranty period; F is the planned 
number of spare LRUs; MF is the unplanned number of spare 
LRUs; C0 is the cost of one LRU; and N is the total number of 
aircraft in service. 
The probabilities PIF and PPF are determined as follows: 
   θτ λτ (λ θ)τ4 1 1IF IFP E T t e e e   ª º   ¬ ¼         (28) 
   λτ (λ θ)τ5 1 1PF PFP E T t e e  ª º   ¬ ¼               (29) 
As seen from equations (28) and (29), 
1IF PFP P                                                                       (30) 
In the second variant of the BMS, it is assumed that the 
aircraft owner has ATE, which allows checking the 
dismantled LRUs at the base airport, but it cannot detect the 
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failed SRUs and intermittent failures. The LRUs with 
permanent failures will be sent to the manufacturer for 
repairing. The LRUs that had intermittent failures will be 
delivered to the stock of spare LRUs. The TLEC2 is defined as 
follows: 
TLEC2 = Cost of breakdown maintenance + Cost of 
transportation of LRUS with permanent failures to the 
manufacturer + Cost of repairing the failed LRUS at the 
manufacturer + Cost of ATE per aircraft + Cost of spare 
LRUS per aircraft 
The TLEC2 is given by 
   
   
2
0 ,
TR PF PF L D TEST M
ATE
TLEC m C C P C t t t
T MTBUR C N M C F MF N
     uª º¬ ¼
 u  
  (31) 
where tTEST is the mean time of testing the dismantled LRU 
with ATE; CATE is the cost of ATE; and M is the number of 
types of LRUs that can be tested with ATE. 
In the third variant of the BMS, the aircraft owner has ATE 
with IFD [14] that allows the inspection of not only the 
dismantled LRUs with PFs and IFs but also allows the 
detection of the location of the failed SRUs. The repair of the 
failed LRUs is conducted by means of replacing the failed 
SRUs. Furthermore, the removed SRUs will be repaired by 
the manufacturer. The TLEC3 comprises the following 
expenses: 
TLEC3 = Cost of breakdown maintenance + Cost of 
transportation of failed SRUs to the manufacturer + Cost of 
repairing SRUs at the manufacturer + Cost of ATE with IFD 
per aircraft + Cost of spare LRUs and SRUs per aircraft 
The TLEC3 is determined as follows: 
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  (32) 
where CPF,R is the average cost of repair of the SRU with a PF 
at the manufacturer’s end; tPF,D is the average time of 
detection of a PF in the dismantled LRU by means of ATE; 
CIF,R is the average cost of repairing the SRU with an IF at  
the manufacturer’s end; tIF,D is the average time of detection 
of an IF in the dismantled LRU by means of ATE and IFD; 
CTR,SRU is the average cost of SRU transportation to the 
manufacturer for repairing; CATE,IFD is the cost of ATE and 
IFD; Cj is the cost of the j-th SRU; Fj is the planned number 
of spare SRUs of the j-th type; and n is the number of SRUs 
in the considered type of LRU. 
4. Model of warehouse spare parts management system 
From equations (27), (31) and (32) follows that each TLEC 
is a function of the planned (F) and unplanned (MF) number 
of spare LRUs in the warehouse at the base airport. The 
optimum number of spare LRUs can be found under the 
following criterion: 
> @  3 σ 0SP M D SE T t F t t t '    oª º¬ ¼                (33) 
From equation (33), if tS ≥ ΔtSP(F) + tM + tD, then there will be 
no violation of flight regularity. In contrast, if tS < ΔtSP(F) + tM 
+ tD, then there will be a violation of flight regularity. For 
determining the optimum number of spare LRUs (F), a 
mathematical model is required for description of the 
WSPMS, which provides the base airport by the spare parts. 
The operation of the WSPMS is modeled by the continuous-
time Markov chain. In Table 1, F is represented as a function 
of the number of aircraft N for the two values of θ, but with a 
fixed λ, indicating the effect of θ on the function, where m = 
3, λ = 0.0002 h−1, tS = 1.3 h, τ = 4 h, and tM = tD = 0.25 h. 
The results of Table 1 correspond to the case when the 
normal delivery time of a spare LRU from the manufacturer is 
five days or intensity of LRU recovery μ = 0.0083 h−1. 
Table 1. Optimal number of spare LRUs as a function of aircraft number 
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
F, (θτ = 0.01) 4 6 6 6 7 8 8 9 9 9 
F, (θτ = 0.001) 3 3 3 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 
 
In practice, the results of Table 1 correspond to the 
situation when there is no ATE at the base airport. The most 
notable features of Table 1 are that a) the function F(N) is an 
integer-valued increasing function, b) an increase of the IF 
rate leads to a significant increase of the number of spare 
LRUs (F), and c) the first case (θτ = 0.01) is more sensitive to 
an increase of the aircraft number at the base airport than the 
second case (θτ = 0.001). This last point indicates that high IF 
rate has a significant impact on the efficiency of the BMS. 
5. Numerical example 
Consider an example of choosing the best variant of the 
BMS for the DME. To choose the best variant of the BMS, 
we calculate the TLEC for each variant and choose the variant 
with minimal TLEC. 
Modern wide body aircraft usually have a dual DME 
installation (m = 2). Assume that DME is used on the board of 
a medium range aircraft. The selected type of DME has a 
modular design and comprises three SRUs: transmitter 
module (TM), receiver module (RM), and electronic power 
supply module (EPSM). The following parameter values are 
chosen identical for all compared variants of the BMS: N = 
10; CTR = 100 ₤; C0 = 10,000 ₤; CL = 10 ₤; T = 40,000 h; τ = 4 
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h; tD = tM = 0.25 h; λ = 2 × 10−4 h−1; tS = 1 h; and μ = 0.0083 
h−1. For the first variant of the BMS, we assume that CIF = 
1500 ₤ and CPF = 2500 ₤. For the first and second variants of 
the BMS, the IF rate is the same, θ = 5 × 10−4 h−1, because 
IFD is not used. If ATE included IFD, then the IF rate was 
usually reduced many times. Therefore, we assumed that θ = 1 
× 10−4 h−1 for the third variant of the BMS. For the second and 
third variants, we assumed the following parameter values: M 
= 25; CATE = 300,000 ₤; CATE,IFD = 600,000 ₤; tTEST = 0.5 h; 
tPF,D = 0.25 h; tIF,D = 1 h; CPF,R = 500 ₤; CIF,R = 600 ₤; and 
CTR,SRU = 50 ₤. By substituting initial data to (28) and (29), we 
calculated that PIF = 0.71 and PPF = 0.29 for the first and 
second variant of the BMS, and PIF = 0.33 and PPF = 0.67 for 
the third variant of the BMS. Table 2 shows the parameter 
values of SRUs. Symbols in Table 2 designate the following 
parameters of the j-th SRU: λj is the PF rate; θj is the IF rate; 
Cj is the cost; tRS,j is the time of repair at the manufacturer’s 
end; and tFD,j is the time of failure detection. 
The optimum number of spare SRUs of the j-th type is 
determined as minimum integer number satisfying the 
following inequality [15]: 
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where Qj = mN + Fj is the total number of the j-th type SRUs 
and P(Qj) is the probability that all LRUs will be provided 
with the j-th type SRUs. 
The results of optimization are given in Table 3. For all 
variants, MF ≈ 0. The planned number of spare SRUs was 
calculated for Qj = 0.995 (j = 1, 2, 3). Using inequality (34), 
we calculated that F1 = 3, F2 = 2, and F3 = 1. From Table 3 it 
follows that the third variant of the BMS has the highest value 
of the average availability and the smallest value of the 
TLEC. Therefore, the third BMS variant is the best. Indeed, 
TLEC3 is 6 times less than TLEC1 and 2.5 times less than 
TLEC2. The third variant of the BMS requires only one spare 
DME, three spare TMs, two spare RMs, and one spare EPSM. 
Table 2. Initial data of SRUs 
Name of SRU λj (h−1) θj (h−1) Cj (₤) tRS,j (h) 
TM (j = 1) 0.00013 0.00005 3500 120 
RM (j = 2) 0.00005 0.000035 5500 120 
EPSM (j = 3) 0.00002 0.000015 1000 120 











i = 1 1430 6 112000 1–5 × 10−11 
i = 2 1430 3 47000 1–5 × 10−11 
i = 3 3335 1 18650 1–1 × 10−11 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to propose a mathematical 
reliability model for a continuously tested avionics LRU 
subject to permanent and intermittent failures. The associated 
lifecycle cost models have been developed to choose the best 
variant of breakdown maintenance management for modern 
avionics systems. The proposed lifecycle cost models for 
avionics systems have been supported by the mathematical 
modelling of the WSPMS on the basis of the continuous-time 
Markov chain. Numerical examples have demonstrated the 
excellent economical efficiency of using ATE with IFD for 
detecting intermittent failures in dismantled avionics LRUs. 
The proposed variants of breakdown maintenance do not 
cover all possible cases of avionics maintenance management 
in practice. However, the developed mathematical models can 
be useful in life-cycle cost analysis of new variants of 
avionics maintenance management. 
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